DISMANTLING ETHIOPIA'S POLITICAL SPACE

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA BOBBY PITTMAN
DEPARTMENT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FRAZER (AF), KRAMER
(DRL), WITTEN (PRM), AND FORT (INR)
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR P, D, F, G, S/CRS, AND S/P
USAID FOR ADMINISTRATOR FORE AND ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS
ALMQUIST (AFR) AND HESS (DCHA)
OSD FOR DAS WHALEN
DNI FOR NIO/AFRICA CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV ASEC EAID ET
SUBJECT: DISMANTLING ETHIOPIA'S POLITICAL SPACE

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 1571 B. ADDIS ABABA 1672

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) This is the first in a series of cables outlining
policy options on U.S.-Ethiopia relations in light of recent
restrictions on political and democratic space (Refs. A and
B).

¶2. (S/NF) The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 under much
fanfare for toppling the brutal communist "Derg" regime,
promising to share power among Ethiopia's strong and diverse
ethnic groups, and pledging political and economic reform.
This hope also led the United States to consider Prime
Minister Meles one of "a new generation" of African leaders.
The EPRDF's refusal to genuinely share power with
independent-minded coalition members such as the Oromo
Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front
(ONLF) in favor of EPRDF-affiliated puppet parties, however,
led these groups to abandon the government in preference for
armed struggle in the early 1990s. Still, the ruling EPRDF
coalition has instituted an appreciable degree of political
reform in Ethiopia since coming to power in 1991. The 2005
pre-election campaign period is the best example of such
openings, with unprecedented live televised debates between
incumbents and contenders, equitable media coverage across
political parties, and unhindered opposition access to
constituencies. Once significant opposition electoral gains
became evident, however, the GoE ceased its experiment with
multi-party democracy and began systematically dismantling
Ethiopia's democratic space. In June and November 2005
Ethiopian security forces used excessive force in firing on
civilian protesters, killing 193 and injuring 763. In
late-2005, security forces detained 30,000-50,000 civilians
without charge, holding them incommunicado in military
controlled camps for nearly three months and arrested 131
senior opposition, civil society, and media leaders on purely
political charges ranging from "outrages against the
constitution," to "treason," to "attempted genocide."

¶3. (S/NF) The precipitous decline in political space has
continued over the past two years. While placating donors by
holding interparty dialogue on contentious issues, the ruling
party effectively rejected recommendations by established
opposition parties. When the lack of serious engagement
forced an opposition walk out, the ruling party leveraged
rubber-stamp endorsements by EPRDF-fabricated opposition
groups to ram through a new National Electoral Board (NEB), a
repressive media law, and a political party financing law
that restricts and denies space to the opposition. In the
past two years the clearly-partisan NEB has rendered suspect
administrative rulings stripping the opposition Coalition for
Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) and Oromo National Congress
(ONC) labels from their freely elected and recognized leaders
(Addis 145). Ruling party cadres' harassment and
intimidation of opposition candidates in the run-up to the
April local elections precluded them from registering for the
April local elections (Addis 596 and Addis 667).
Additionally, the NEB's bureaucratic delays -- and refusals
-- in approving domestic election observers prevented
credible organizations from observing the elections (Addis
1065). Together these efforts guaranteed an overwhelming
marginalization of any political opposition in the 2008 local
elections. Ultimately, the opposition took only three out of
3.6 million contested seats in April's local elections. In
our assessment, the local elections significantly increased
voter apathy and deep frustration over the chances of
building on the political gains of the 2005 campaign period
and election results.

¶4. (S/NF) Beyond the scope of formal politics, the GoE's
brutal conduct of counter-insurgency operations and harsh
oppression of other ethnic groups betray the minority
regime's desperate attempts to remain internal control at all
costs. And the costs are high. In the Ogaden region,
systematic reports by Human Rights Watch and other credible
groups of summary executions, rapes, forced conscription,
detentions, and beatings by the Ethiopian military against
the civilian population (see 2008 Ethiopia Human Rights
Report) combined with intentional impediments to the delivery
of humanitarian relief supplies (Addis 1284) reveal the GoE
tactics that undermine the local population's confidence in
the government and drive locals to further support
insurgents. Granted that ONLF actions in the Ogaden have
increased violence, we have urged the ENDF and GoE that a
violent response is not the answer. We have passed Gen.
Petraeus' manual on counterinsurgency operations to senior
GoE and ENDF leaders as a framework for dealing with the
ONLF. CJTF-HOA's inability to conduct civil affairs
operations in that region, combined with the close USG-GoE
partnership in the public's mind not only prevents us from
winning hearts and minds -- something in our own national
interest -- but risks allowing the public to conflate the USG
with the actions being conducted by our strategic partner --
further putting U.S. national interests at risk as the local
population begins to view the U.S. as the enemy. While the
tactics are not as extreme or pervasive there, the parallels
in the GoE's strategy of maintaining control in the Oromiya
region have similarly marginalized the country's largest
ethnic group. The perceived USG complacency with these
actions, in the minds of Oromos, is best exemplified by one
Oromo opposition leader's equation of the U.S.-GoE
relationship today with the U.S. relationship with the Shah
of Iran in the 1950s-1970s.

¶5. (S/NF) Mounting efforts to marginalize civil society
represent the latest dynamic in the GoE's strategy of
eliminating dissent -- a process begun in early 2005 when
Ethiopia became the first country in twenty years to expel
the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International
Republican Institute (IRI), and IFES. Despite acquitting the
civil society leaders detained after the 2005 post-election
turmoil on the sole charge they faced, the Ethiopian court on
that same day imposed a new charge and convicted the two
leaders without the opportunity for a defense. The GoE's
refusal to release the two on parole in stark contrast to
standard practice and under a clear directive from the ruling
party's central committee (Addis 260), only confirmed the
GoE's intolerance for dissent.

¶6. (S/NF) In April, the Ethiopian Embassy in Washington and
the Foreign Ministry began informing USAID-funded NGOs that
the GoE would no longer register USAID implementing partners
in Ethiopia, instead requiring them to operate under more
tenuous Memoranda of Understanding signed with specific GoE
entities. On May 2, the final nail was unveiled as the
Justice Ministry distributed a draft civil society
proclamation -- reportedly developed personally by Prime
Minister Meles and the Justice Minister -- that effectively
bars civil society groups from activities in the democracy,
good governance, human rights, community development,
conflict resolution, justice, and law enforcement sectors,
and establisheQdraconian penalties for civil society
individuals who violate the highly subjective authorities of
a new civil society agency (Addis 1223). Entry,
registration, and operations of technical assistance and
other contractor personnel and commodities are becoming
increasingly problematic with the GoE. A very-poorly
introduced requirement replacing the previous VAT exemption
for foreign assistance implementing partners with a
to-be-established VAT reimbursement scheme and the GoE's
elimination of duty free imports for implementing partners
appears to violate the Ethiopia-U.S. Bilateral Assistance
Agreement (Ref. B). The GoE's recent refusal to register
U.S. implementing partners or accord them bilateral
Agreement-secured privileges is even more problematic.


¶7. (S/NF) Embassy Addis Ababa views this precipitous
narrowing of Ethiopia's political space as undermining
Ethiopia's stability which could affect the entire Horn of
Africa region.

YAMAMOTO
Source