Woyanne’s Anti-Ethiopianism and the Italo-Ethiopian War

Selam Beyene | July 27th, 2013
The history of Ethiopia is replete with contradictions and paradoxes. There are accounts galore of heroism and meekness, patriotism and treachery, devotion and apathy, and, above all, fear of God and acts of brutality in that ancient country. These chronicles may help provide clues about the root causes of the Woyane anti-Ethiopia schema and the appropriate plan of action needed to deracinate them.

By anti-Ethiopianism we purport the systematic and government-sanctioned weakening of the national fabric by pitting one ethnic group against another, as was witnessed recently in such areas as Benishangul-Gumuz and Gura Ferda zones. Anti-Ethiopianism is the appalling government policy of dislocating natives from their ancestral lands and transferring national wealth to foreigners at dirt cheap prices. It is anti-Ethiopianism to frame a constitution whose central object is to promote the disintegration and land-lockedness of the country. Most importantly, anti-Ethiopianism implies the deviant system of government under which all major economic, political and military institutions are controlled by the minority Woyane group, and through which fundamental human rights are suppressed and the people are denied their basic rights to participate in free and fair elections.

Confucius sagaciously advised: “Study the past if you would define the future.” Accordingly, when we consider the current predicaments of the country, which are characterized by ethnocentrism, totalitarianism, corruption, nepotism and absence of a feeling of Ethiopian patriotism amongst the rulers; and, most importantly, when we search for a viable solution to them, we should go no further for clues and explanations than the recent past events, beginning with the invasion of Italy in 1935-1940.

Much has been documented about the infamous Fascist aggression by notable Ethiopian and Western historians, journalists and novelists, as well as other writers who had taken active parts in the actual war. While well-researched history books and journal articles may serve as the ultimate sources for academic exercise, there is considerable information that may be gleaned from anecdotal accounts narrated by individuals based on their personal experiences. In this regard, we are fortunate to have at our disposal now the writings of three foreigners who had the opportunity to witness firsthand the savagery of the Fascist aggression, the heroism of the Ethiopian fighters, and the betrayal by local collaborators.

The three foreigners, whose paths had crossed several times in the battles of Tembien, Maichew and other fronts, had fought on the side of Ethiopia under the leaderships of such eminent Ethiopians as Ras Kassa Hailu Darge, Ras Seyoum Mengesha and Ras Mulugeta Yiggezu, the War Minister. In so doing, they were able to record considerable historical data and to leave behind intriguing accounts of bravery and treachery that could inform present and future researchers seeking answers to some of the most complex questions about present-day Ethiopia. Most importantly, they provide critical insights into the underlying reasons for the anti-Ethiopian agenda Zenawi and his Woyane entourage successfully exploited to catapult themselves to power; the continued damage to the long-term viability of the country that is caused by the misguided fiscal, economic, educational and military policies implemented by the TPLF-led regime; and the institutionalization of ethnic-based governance that is portentously promoted to nurture inter-ethnic animosity among brothers and sisters who have lived in relative harmony for many centuries.

Recently, the works of two of the foreigners were made accessible to Amharic readers. The first, ቀይ አንበሳ (Alpha, 2003) was translated by Tesfaye M. Bayileyegn from the original narration of Colonel Alejandro del Valle1. The second book, የሃበሻ ጀብዱ (AAU Press, 2010), is a translation by Techane J. Mekonnen based on Adolf Parlesack’s memoir in Czech entitled Habesska Odyssea (Praha : Panorama, 1989). The third, and most controversial, memoir was written by Colonel Feodor Konovalov, a Russian military adviser to Ras Seyoum Mengesha and other leaders. While there is no accessible Amharic translation of Konovalov’s writings, relevant excerpts are available in various sources (see, e.g., Clarke III, 2008 2).

Excepting a few and infrequent inconsistencies among the renditions of the three foreigners about shared events that they had jointly witnessed, there is a remarkable degree of consistency in their accounts of the breathtaking gallantry of Ethiopian fighters, as well as the distressingly heartrending treachery of domestic collaborators, especially from Tigray, Rayya, and Azebo regions, in the early days of the war.

Although Konovalov was generally silent on the contribution of the traitors to the defeat of Ethiopia, he was in remarkable concord with the other two in expressing awe and admiration at the inimitable valor and fearlessness of the Ethiopian army in the face of an infinitely better armed enemy. Quoting a Western diplomat, Konovalov was unhesitant to affirm: “… the Ethiopian soldier, well-taught and well-led, had no equal anywhere in the world.” The memoirs of all three abound with their eyewitness accounts of how, defying all odds against them, waves of primitively armed Ethiopian fighters, composed of men and women from every ethnic group, religious persuasion and social ladder, stormed, time and again, well fortified Italian positions, sending terror and confusion among the enemy. As one reads about the surreal exploits of those brave fighters, the knowledge of belonging to a people of such valiance and heroism fills one’s heart with a sense of immense pride. In one instance, for example, del Valle tells of a story in which the Ethiopians ferociously and unstoppably climbed up a hill to engage the enemy that was assailing them from above with automatic weapons and mustard gas. In summarizing his amazement at the extraordinary scene he was witnessing, he wrote: “The efforts of the invaders to try to stop those brave Ethiopians, who were charging uphill over the bodies of their fallen compatriots, was like firing bullets from machine guns to futilely slow down the gushing of water downhill.”

The foreigners also documented heroic accomplishments of ordinary citizens, whose names never made it to the history books, but who had demonstrated unimaginable bravery on the battlefields. Among such stories eloquently told by Parlesack, none is probably as fascinating as that of a young Oromo boy from the Sellale region by the name of Abichou. Parlesack describes with a Homeric touch the valiance of the boy as he terrorized the Fascist aggressors, chased to their deaths many of the traitors, coordinated a multi-ethnic army from Hamassen, Tigray, Gojjam and Sellale, and scored countless victories against the invading army.

Parlesack and del Valle were also unreserved in their expression of disgust at the degree of betrayal and treachery perpetrated by some members of the Tigray, Rayya and Azebo regions that made the campaigns of the great armies of Ras Seyoum, Ras Kassa and Ras Mulugetta immeasurably arduous. Parlesack even hinted that the balance of power at the battle of Maichew was tipped in favor of the invaders, thanks in great part to the sabotage of the traitors from Rayya and Azebo, who inflicted considerable damage on the advancing Ethiopian army coming from behind at critical moments.

Among the most notorious traitors of the era was Dejazmach Haile Sellasie Gugsa, a great grandson of Emperor Yohannis IV, who gave his allegiance to Benito Mussolini in the early days of the war. This traitor facilitated the invasion of Mekelle in November of 1935, and later joined the invading army that marched on Addis Ababa in April of 1936. Throughout the occupation, he provided invaluable service as a trusted adviser to both Rodolfo Graziani and the Duke of Aosta. Remarkably, his first demonstration of treachery was to raise the Italian flag in Mekelle, desecrating the Ethiopian tri-colors. Over six decades later, another traitor, the late Meles Zenawi, would defile that same flag.

Indeed, in the face of the well-known anti-Ethiopian sentiment unabashedly exhibited by Zenawi, and now aggressively implemented by his successors, it is not beyond the realm of rational proclivity to wonder whether the turncoats of the Italo-Ethiopian war did not influence the imprudent minds of the current traitors.

Much has been disclosed about the dubious family tree of the late dictator and the backgrounds of some of those in the Woyane leadership. Regarding the notorious heritage of Zenawi, Gebremedhin Araya, a one-time TPLF fighter and an accomplished authority on the late dictator’s family history, has given gripping testimonials, in a series of ESAT interviews, how the dictator’s mind might have been poisoned while growing up in a family that had always betrayed the land they lived in. There are also troubling accounts of the backgrounds of most of the Woyane leaders, including the notorious Bereket Simon, Sibhat Negga and several others.

At a time when there is a lot of confusion among some sectors of the Ethiopian community about the true nature of the Woyane regime and its hidden agenda, it is absolutely critical to see the treachery of the rulers through the prism of their treasonous forefathers. This is especially indispensable in any effort to raise the awareness of the people of Tigray in whose name these traitors are causing immeasurable damage. Although there were several traitors who, like Haile Sellasie Gugsa, sided with the enemy and fought against the Ethiopian army, there were also exemplary patriots from the same region who valiantly fought and died in defense of their motherland against Fascist invasion. Similarly, despite the common perception that many Tigreans today are backers of the evil dictatorship, it should be incontrovertibly affirmed that there is a large proportion of Tigreans who abhor the destructive and anti-Ethiopian path followed by the Woyane regime.

The late dictator and his party have always projected themselves as saviors of the people from the tyrannical rule of the Derg. Unfortunately, many genuine Ethiopians have overlooked the fact that the Woyane regime is not only a most vicious authoritarian system, as the Derg was, but also an atrocious organization whose ultimate objective is the destruction of Ethiopia as a nation. In actual fact, no rational government in history has unilaterally advocated the dismemberment of the country it rules, made attempts to justify its isolation through land-lockedness, parceled out precious lands to foreigners at dirt cheap prices, or systematically used ethnicity, famine, illiteracy and disease as instruments to enslave the people it governs, to the extent the Woyane rulers have done so. It is therefore vitally important to effectively establish the anti-Ethiopian identity of the regime, and to reignite the patriotism of those members of the society who have been hoodwinked by the pervasive propaganda campaign that the regime has successfully, but spitefully, launched to portray itself as a better alternative to the brutal Derg dictatorship.

A major weakness of the pro-democracy movement thus far has been its hopeless ineptitude to articulate precisely why the Woyane philosophy is anti-Ethiopian, and how dangerous that philosophy is to the long-term viability of the country. The suppression of basic human rights, the codification of ethnocentrism in the constitution, the irresponsible policy of land grabs, the pitting of one ethnic group against another, and the unfettered corruption among the leaders of the regime have not been effectively communicated to the people as manifestations of this general scheme of anti-Ethiopianism that the Woyane leadership has perfected over the past several decades.

Indubitably, the only realistic strategy that would guarantee the certain destruction of the Woyane regime is one that successfully establishes and communicates to the people of Ethiopia this abhorrent nature of the regime. Without a thorough understanding of the TPLF as a perfidious organization by the people of Ethiopia in general, and those of Tigray in particular, there cannot be a unified front that is a prerequisite for a successful outcome of the struggle to save the country, liberate the oppressed, and establish a democratic system where individual freedoms would flourish and the long-term survival of Ethiopia would be guaranteed. As they have heroically demonstrated to the world before, during and after the Italo-Ethiopian war, there is nothing that unifies and arouses the fighting spirit of the people of Ethiopia more than a sense of direct threat to their heritage and independence either by foreign aggressors or domestic connivers. Pro-democracy forces, Websites, and other groups and individuals, therefore, have the moral imperative to reignite the ardor of the people to defend their country by raising their awareness as to the true nature of the treasonous organization that is Woyane.
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[1]In “Un hombre blanco en el infierno negro por el Coronel Alejandro del Valle” as told to Arturo Alfonso Roselló (Havana: Impreso en los Talleres Tipograficos, 1937)).
[2] Clarke III, JV, “Feodor Konovalov and the Italo-Ethiopian War (Part I), World War II Quarterly, 2008; 5:4-37

The writer may be reached at beyene50@gmail.com

Ethiopia's Fragmented Elites: Origins and Syndromes

By Messay Kebede

One question that regularly and intensely consumes the mind of many Ethiopians is the question of knowing why Ethiopian elites are unable to work together. Especially those opposing the TPLF regime, even though they are well aware that the regime is their common enemy, invariably prove unable to agree on a common political agenda, let alone to act in concert to remove their common foe. Is the failure to act jointly due to irrational forces or is it the outcome of definite causes that are susceptible of a rational explanation? This paper is an attempt to rationally comprehend the failure, with the hope that some such comprehension will have a liberating impact, obvious as it is that the conscious awareness of the forces of division is liable to significantly reduce their grip on the mind of Ethiopian elites.

The first answer that springs to mind to the question why Ethiopian elites are unable to work together is, of course, the lack of unity. But the latter is more of a question than an answer. For, why is there such a deficiency of unity? Why are elites, despite their enduring frustration toward the regime, nay their recurring conviction that the regime is leading the country to chaos, incapable of overcoming their divisions?

The seriousness of the matter forces us to look for causes transcending the immediate preoccupations of Ethiopian elites, the very ones having to do with historical reasons. I submit that the most compelling causes are historical in that the lack of unity is a product of the ideological and political struggles since the dawn of the Ethiopian process of modernization. Let me explain.

Socio-Historical Causes

The appearance of a centralized and oppressive government and its ever-tightening grip over the country as essential ingredients of the Ethiopian process of modernization have entailed a growing rivalry over the control of power and wealth among old and emerging elites. As the progress of modernization modified the Ethiopian social fabric, the rivalry intensified. It reached its peak in the 60s when the conflict between the old nobility and the imperial state on the one hand and the various modern sectors (students, intellectuals, the emerging bourgeoisie, the bureaucratic and military elites, etc.) on the other hand increasingly took a political and ideological form.

Where there is no enough wealth, state power becomes the privileged instrument to exclude competitors. The need to exclude generates, in turn, radical ideologies either in the form of hardened conservatism or extreme revolutionarism. The function of radical ideologies is to justify the political exclusion of opponents. Thus, to the conservatism of the nobility and the imperial state in the 60s and early 70s, students and intellectuals opposed socialism and ethnonationalism. The ideology of socialism allows elites to claim that they are the sole representatives of the working people, thereby depriving other competing elites of the right to represent the overwhelming majority of the people. As to ethnonationalism, it restricts the right to represent a given ethnic group to native elites, and so denies all political legitimacy to non-kin elites. Unsurprisingly, both ideologies justify absolute power as necessary to effect the exclusion.

The characteristics of a state whose function is to exclude rivals are quite different from a democratic state. In the latter, not only conflicts are recognized, but they are also provided with the means of reaching an accommodation based on the verdict of the people. The provision of accommodation prevents the recourse to violence to settle disputes. By contrast, the excluding state rejects all form of accommodation, leaving to opponents no other choice than the overthrow of the state by violent means.

This politics of exclusion foments a culture of confrontation pursuing a zero-sum game. The fact that winners take all, in addition to exasperating the conflicts between elites, inaugurates an endless cycle of violent confrontations during which one group overthrows the ruling elite until it is itself overthrown by another group and so on. The intensification of conflicts undermines the unity of the country and, most of all, weakens the ability of elites to work together by fostering a culture of mutual animosity and mistrust. As a result, the effort to generate a democratic state is repeatedly foiled. Clearly, these characteristics trace an accurate portrait of the Ethiopian state and elites.

The main drawback of a state practicing exclusion is the lack of legitimacy. One group subduing other groups by means of force does not mean that the subdued groups recognize the authority of the state and are willing to obey. On the contrary, the groups are in a state of permanent rebellion and are just waiting for the opportunity to reverse the situation in their favor. However, their expectation makes victims of the lack of legitimacy of the state by nurturing an anarchic idea of entitlement to power. Indeed, where the state lacks legitimacy, many individuals feel entitled to aspire for the ownership of power. This aspiration stands in the way of the effort to create a collaborative spirit among elites by ignite mistrust and rivalry.

A pertinent illustration of fragmentation is the tendency to create parties revolving around individuals rather than being based on ideas and goals. Nothing better confirms the truth of this analysis than the anarchic proliferation of parties in Ethiopia whose number is estimated to be more than eighty. Worse yet, these parties have the tendency to split into smaller parties because disagreements cannot be managed democratically. Given that influential individuals consider political parties as their private possession, they are apt to create a splinter party by walking away with their followers each time internal disputes arise.

Extraverted Psyche

One must not forget that the flourishing of radical ideologies in Ethiopia is a direct consequence of modern education. Insofar as a system of education alien to the country’s history and culture has shaped modern Ethiopian elites, it has greatly facilitated the absorption of imported ideologies. The main outcome of Western education is not only to undermine the inherited common culture, but it is also to inculcate the paradigm of modernity versus tradition. The weakening of the common culture lessens unity while the paradigm of modernity values imitativeness by advocating the rejection of whatever is traditional as uncivilized, backward and by painting Western countries as the model to follow.

This copyism or extraverted psyche is one of the reasons why the modern educated sector of Ethiopian society easily adopted Marxism-Leninism, which was the dominant ideology in the 60s and early 70s. The Marxist-Leninist definition of political struggle as a resolute elimination of rivals, as opposed to the accommodative stand of democracy, became the rule for Ethiopian elites, while ideological radicalization further exasperated their conflicts to the point where they were perceived as irreconcilable. The high point of these antagonistic relationships was none other than the insidious proliferation of ethnonationalism among the educated elites.

The Lack of Galvanizing Ideas

The progressive decline of the fascination with Marxism-Leninism as a result of repeated economic and political failures of socialist countries and the prevalence of liberal democracy constitute an additional reason for the fragmentation of elites. The undeniable power of Marxism-Leninism was that it was a galvanizing ideology in that it identified the interests of elites with the liberation and empowerment of the working masses. The identification provided a nationalist vision investing elites, especially students and intellectuals, with the electrifying mission of becoming the liberators of the masses from oppression and exploitation and of their country from imperialism. Liberalism offers none of the excitements associated with revolutionary goals.

True, liberalism can inspire a fervent defense of freedom that can be as revolutionary as the idea of socialism. But we must see it in the context of Ethiopia, that is, of a mentality not yet emancipated from the totalitarian doctrine of the 60s. Such a mentality could not but amalgamate liberalism with Leninism, the outcome of which is the confusion of liberalism with individualism. The attempt to combine ethnonationalism with liberal principles, as sadly exemplified by the ruling ideology of the TPLF, is the worst form of the confusion.

The amalgam tries to apply liberalism while suppressing freedom in all its manifestations because of the Leninist remnant of politics defined as exclusion of opponents. Together with the caricature of liberalism by those who control power, there spreads among elites the interpretation of liberalism in the direction of selfish individualism. For this distorted liberalism, individuals should not be concerned about other people; their only worry should be their own interests so that all pursuit of grand causes is devalued. Clearly, where egoistic individualism becomes the norm, unity of purpose among elites is difficult to achieve.

In Ethiopia, the unity of purpose has been seriously hindered both by the proliferation of ethnonationalist ideologies and by the inability to find a matching or counter ideology against ethnonationalism. The choice is reduced to being either a supporter, an opponent, or a resigned tolerant of ethnonationalism. The perversion of Ethiopia with ethnonationalist ideologies is a stumbling block to the formation of a common purpose if only because the threat to the integrity of the nation deprives competitors of a common cause. Since elites rejecting the Ethiopian nationhood aspire either to secede or to become dominant, they cannot work together with those who defend the unity of the nation, still less can they accept an all-embracing ideology.

Divide-and-Rule Strategy and the Politics of Fear

Given that the fragmentation of Ethiopian elites along ethnic lines is the work of the TPLF, it follows that the main culprit for the lack of unity is the TPLF regime itself. It is important to note here that the TPLF did not only divide Ethiopia along ethnic states, but it also opted for a terrorist method of government, the essential function of which is the inculcation of fear. Government by fear has a paralyzing effect: though the overwhelming majority of elites is set against the regime, it cannot act in concert to get rid of the regime because of the paralyzing effect of fear. Instead of action, resignation takes the lead with the consequence that the dislike of the regime never transcends the subjective realm of feelings so as to translate into political action.

Be it noted that one of the effects of fear is the propensity to justify the postponement of political action. Indeed, fear provides justification for not acting together by enhancing little differences to the level of a fundamental disagreement. To the question of why opponents do not act together to remove the regime, the ready answer is the absence of agreement. Magnifying minor differences is how fear camouflaged itself into a valid reason for not acting, thereby avoiding the risks and dangers implied in political action. Not only does fear paralyze, but it also inspires fragmentation as a way of deferring political action. It is because dictatorial governments know that elites broken by fear cannot act in concert that they resort to systematic campaigns designed to spread fear.

In default of promoting action, fear encourages wishful thinking. Terror induces hope but in the form of magic or fantasy. Evidence of this is the recurrent predication of an imminent collapse of the regime by many opponents. By underestimating the strength and survival capacity of the regime, they tell us that it is on its last legs, though nothing is being done to turn the hope into reality. This kind of magical faith is another way of avoiding the risks and sacrifices necessary to actually remove the regime. There is some consolation in doing nothing when it is believed that magical forces are bound to intervene in our favor.

Beyond the Humiliated Generation

All the defects hampering rival elites pertain to a generation that has gone through the bitter experience of defeat and humiliation. The dreams of the generation of the 60s and early 70s have been squashed by the victory of the Derg whose dictatorial rule decimated its morale and that of their offspring. Both were offered nothing but the humiliation of a massive exodus. Whether they stayed in the country or left, all experienced another cycle of humiliating events when they witnessed, powerless, the defeat of the Ethiopian army, the invasion of the country by an ethnic army, and the secession of Eritrea. It is hard not to infer from these events a severe damage to Ethiopian nationalism and an erosion of self-confidence such that the generation’s belief in its ability to accomplish great things has received a deadly blow. Without self-confidence, the readiness to unite for a great cause is also likely to suffer gravely.

Defeat and humiliation entail leadership crisis. Just as a defeated army questions the competence of its commanding officers, so too a vanquished generation loses faith in leadership. Once leadership is distrusted, the willingness to unite in an organization is drastically reduced. No less than the need to accomplish great goals, confidence in leaders is a requirement of unity. Without exaggeration, leadership crisis is one of the crucial setbacks of post-revolutionary Ethiopia, all the more so as the Ethiopian culture is prone to the cult of heroes, as witnessed by the fact that its past history shows that the death or the exceptional courage of leaders often determined the fate of wars.

It would be naive to expect from a wounded generation the solutions to Ethiopia’s numerous problems. What was ruined by one generation cannot be fixed by the same generation. True change requires, above all, culture change, which takes time because it is a matter of creativity and growth. In short, real change is a generational issue. The TPLF, secessionist groups, and their opponents are all products of the dominant culture of the 60s. Their collaborations and conflicts show that society follows a determined path until it sees a precipice. The generation that takes the precipice as a precipice, and not as a redress of a vile social order, is the one called upon to change the direction. It sees an impasse in what other characterize as positive or negative developments.

When things go wrong, the culprits and their opponents are the two poles of the same reality. To the extent that the thinking of the one is just the opposite of the other, they are one and the same, as they remain tied to each other by their very contradiction. Thus, as action and reaction, the Derg and the TPLF are one and the same. That is why many of the actions of the TPLF often give us the impression of a déjà vu. That is why also, just as the Derg, the TPLF is unable to solve the problems of Ethiopia.

The generation that is free of the thinking uniting the Derg and the TPLF is alone able to bring real change to Ethiopia. However, the condition of its emancipation grows from the previous opposition, the development of which draws the limit beyond which the precipice lies. Reaching the limit clears the ground for the new, for “where danger is, also grows the saving power,” as says Heidegger. Whether such a generation is in sight is hard to tell. One thing is sure, though: the best that the defeated generation and perhaps their immediate descendant can do is to take a hard critical look at themselves and exchange their ambition to remain makers of history for the much more subdued role of midwife of the coming repaired generation.

Nelson Mandela: Godfather Of Neo-Apartheid South Africa

By Thomas C. Mountain

As Nelson Mandela lays on his death bed his legacy as the godfather of neo-Apartheid South Africa has been firmly established.

Today in South Africa life for many if not most is nearly as precarious and undignified as when Mandela was first inaugurated as President some 20 years ago. So the best way to describe 'modern' South Africa is it is being oppressed by a new form of apartheid.

But wait a minute, didn't Mandela's becoming the first black president of South Africa lead to the restoration of ownership of the land stolen from the African population nearly a hundred years previously by the racist colonial settler Apartheid regime?

No, no real land reform for the masses of land less Africans. But Mandela did make sure that the international mining companies got whatever new land they thought they might need.

And while plenty of the country's staple food, maize(corn), is being grown in South Africa today (South Africa is one of the leading maize exporters in the world) the people of the country still struggle every day to be able to buy enough maize to feed their families.

Speaking of the mining companies, which are the basis of the great wealth of the country, didn't Mandela at one time promise to nationalize them and use their fabulous wealth to benefit the people of South Africa?

Yes he did promise such and no he didn't keep his promise. But he did sweep aside all restrictions on the mine owners relocating their headquarters outside the country the better NOT to pay taxes.

And the promise to provide adequate drinking water to ALL the people of South Africa? No, that promise wasn't kept either, though under his governments leadership Mandela did allow the mining companies to continue to poison the underground water aquifers in many parts of the country.

Didn't Mandela promise to provide free universal public education to his people? The answer to this question might best be found by asking the miners who went on strike last year in part because they could not afford the school fees for their children.

Isn't life for South Africa's people more prosperous, don't they have more money in their pocket and a better standard of living? According to President Zuma, South Africa's per capita GDP is 40% more today than 20 years ago when the original Apartheid system was ended.

But the cost of living in the past 20 years has outstripped wage increases resulting in an actual lowering of living standards for the masses of people.

But what about life expectancy and health in general in the country, aren't South Africans living longer than ever before? No again, life expectancy under Mandela and friends suffered a steep drop from which it has yet to recover, thanks in part to the failure of Mandela and his cronies failing to take the HIV/AIDS pandemic seriously.

And today the HIV clinics in South Africa stand empty of much needed medicines due to the the ANC government cutting funding for such.

Once upon a time the liberation ballad sung by the ANC headed by Mandela included the refrain 'One Settler, One Bullet'. Today some suspect the toasts made in the board rooms of the multinationals plundering South Africa are begun by declaring 'One Miner, One

Bullet' as the South Africa police at the behest of both the ANC and mine owners have begun, once again, to open fire on striking miners.

So life is little better for most South Africans and the whites still own the land and mines. Food, water, education and drugs to fight HIV are all in short supply or completely lacking but one thing not lacking at all is corruption, lots and lots of corruption throughout the ANC lead government.

It seems that ALL the top leaders in the ANC, no matter the faction, stand accused of corruption, of lining their own pockets at the expense of the people and the well worn path of such runs directly to Mandela's front door as well, though no journalist or their editors has yet had the courage to open it and let the truth be known to the world.

Twenty years ago Nelson Mandela was the Father of what became the neo-Apartheid system in South Africa and today, while laying on his death bed he has truly earned the title of Godfather of Neo-Apartheid, for what else can you call what is officially the most unequal system of social equality in the world today, modern, 'Post Apartheid' South Africa.

Editor's Note:
Thomas C. Mountain is the most widely distributed independent journalist in Africa, living and reporting from Eritrea since 2006. He can be reached at thomascmountain_at_yahoo_dot_com