Ethiopia: The Clash of Pax Britannica and Pax Africana Over the Nile River

By Nurye Yassin, 1 March 2014


opinion

Egypt's incessant insistence on its singular utilization, use and development of the Nile River remains a mantra, lingering on in north-eastern Africa as Egyptian politicians, opinion makers, academics and media continue to insist on the sacrosanctity of the exclusive entitlement of their country to the Nile waters.

This, of course, was implanted under the shade of the Pax Britannica, long gone except in Egypt. Equally, it is an insistence that appears incompatible with the Pax Africana to which the upstream states subscribe and which promotes the equitable and fair, mutually beneficial usage and development of the Nile for all present and future generations. Implementation of the Pax Africana use of the Nile, however, is under pressure from the diplomatic and political armory of Egypt's version of the Pax Britannica, which in theory offered Egypt full utilization of the River Nile under colonial-era agreements of the last century.

Egyptian presumptions about its control of the Nile waters are currently filling the output of its media, academia and politics and in its international relations as the Nile Basin countries leap into forging on an agreement that benefits all. They have also been sparked off by the launch of Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP), a central element in Ethiopia's efforts to escape from the repeated and painful experiences of famine, poverty and instability. Ethiopia's successful efforts to encourage fair share and utilization of the Nile waters have reactivated the selfishly unilateral illusions of Egyptian politicians, intellectuals and journalists even in this age of multilateralism. The Renaissance Dam has become the spark to encourage the politicians to try to revitalize the inviolability of their supposed 'acquired' and 'historical' rights.

They appear, regrettably, once again to have started another hydro-diplomatic and political campaign with the objective of trying to persuade European countries and international financial institutions to refuse any technical and financial support to the GERDP. A source from the Egyptian Government told the Al Monitor paper on February 19 that "Egypt will continue its international escalation and all options are open to us to protect our share of the Nile waters." He added that "more negotiations with Ethiopia only waste time and directly threaten Egypt's water security." Egypt has also launched a strategy of trying to encourage Arab countries to denounce the construction of the dam. One example of this came when Mohammad Abdel Motalib, the then Egyptian Irrigation Minister, vilified the Turkish Foreign Minister's recent visit to Addis Ababa. He went on to compare Turkey's Ataturk Dam with the Renaissance Dam, adding that the Ataturk Dam had left the Syrians and Iraqis thirsty. Egypt is planning not only to internationalize its anti-Dam campaign but also Arabize it to alienate Ethiopia in its friendly diplomatic, political and economic relations with the Arab world.

Egypt's moves to block funds and technical support to the development of the Nile and its tributaries are nothing new. Over the last century, diplomatic intrigues supplemented by colonial attitudes and Cold War rivalries, helped Egypt disrupt and prevent the Lake Tana projects in the early 1930s, the Abbay master plan studies (1958-64), the Gilgel Abbay project in the 1960s, the Tana Beles development project of the mid-1980s and a number of other proposed water development projects in Ethiopia. These efforts to disrupt and destroy development projects continued even during the periods when the peoples of Ethiopia were suffering from the disastrous droughts and famines of the 1970s and 1980s when millions starved and died. The concerns of Egyptian politicians for people have never extended beyond their own borders. Attempting to block financial and technical support was not the only strategy employed by previous Egyptian governments. Haggai Erlich, Professor of Middle Eastern and African History, has noted that President Nassir consistently deployed a hydro-political and geopolitical strategy to weaken Ethiopia and destabilize the country.

It was Nassir who first came up with the idea of a mythical, Eritrean Arabism, to encourage support for turning the Red Sea into an Arab sphere of influence as well as gaining control of the sources of the Blue Nile, after his equally imaginative idea of creating and leading a State of the Union of the Nile Valley collapsed. The government of President Sadat followed the idea up, requesting Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Kuwait and others to accept the responsibility of supporting the Eritrean revolt. The effect was to force any attempts at a development agenda in Ethiopia into necessary issues of security and defense. Professor Daniel Kende, using global intelligence sources, has also given details of the way Egypt committed itself to supply light and medium arms and explosives, military intelligence and expertise to the Government of Eritrea during in Ethiopia-Eritrea war during Mubarak's time in power after Eritrea invaded Ethiopia in May 1998. Destabilizing Ethiopia, in fact, was a central element in Egypt's strategy to extend its 'acquired' and 'historic' rights and avoid sharing the use of the Nile upstream. Planting his belligerence stance to solely marshal all the affairs of the Horn of Africa, President Isayas Afework has been struggling to weaken Ethiopia's march towards peace, stability and prosperity, according to a 2008 Chatham House Report. Based on his intransigent strategic goal, he expressed his support for Egypt's claim to 'historical rights' to the Nile waters through his Foreign Minister, Osman Saleh, and Advisor, Yemane Gebreab, in April 2013.

The recent high level exchange of visits and meetings between Eritrea and Egypt entail the stratagem to outfox Ethiopia's fight against poverty and instability and outwit upstream countries' efforts to replace the 'historical rights' of Egypt with a more reasonable and equitable utilization of the Nile waters. Nassir's Pan-Arab revolution did not confine its anti-Ethiopian policies to Eritrea. In addition to trying to undermine Ethiopia's geo-political interests in the Red Sea, it was also directed towards the Indian Ocean, encouraging the concept of 'Greater Somalia' in order to annex Ethiopia's Somali-speaking region and to encourage Somali nationalists to claim Harar, already known of course as one of the holiest places of Islam and the political center for the activities of Ahmed Gragn in the 16thcentury. The continuing effect of the conflicts and incursions from Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s, and subsequently, had a major impact in weakening any attempts by Ethiopia to eradicate poverty, drought and famine in the later part of the last century. Egypt, it might be added, took no interest in the effect its policies have also had on the lives of millions of Somalis as well as Ethiopians. In the 1960s, Emperor Haile Selassie expressed his apprehension over President Nassir's behavior, noting that "the Somalis would have never dreamt of such an idea without being incited by Nassir." President Nassir's successors have continued in the same approach, supporting President Siad Barre, and more recently stirring up various Somali extremists to oppose and attempt to destabilize Ethiopia.

The effects of all this can be seen throughout the Horn of Africa, in civil-wars, inter-state conflicts, drought, famine and other catastrophes. The main goal of Egypt's strategy in destabilizing Ethiopia as well as subverting its efforts to get funds for development of the Nile or indeed other projects has been to sustain the colonial treaties of Pax Britannica and its 'water imperialism'. This meant that the strategy is also directed against any efforts by other upstream countries to develop and use the Nile waters as part of the decolonization process and their own development. The result is a major fault line between Egypt, acting as promoter of the unjust use of the Nile River originally implanted by the British Empire, and Ethiopia and other riparian countries, the promoters of the Pax Africana's view of equal and fair utilization of the Nile under which all the peoples of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and all other upstream countries can find, discuss and find solutions to any disagreements over the use of the river.

It is particularly disheartening for upstream countries and for Ethiopia, of course, that Egypt persists in its outdated political and diplomatic efforts to try to internationalize water development projects. It stands in vivid contradiction to the concept of the Pax Africana that aims to promote and assist in the full engagement of Africans, all Africans, in the development of Africa's strategic efforts to maintain peace, stability, security and prosperity. As Ethiopia has persistently demonstrated, it believes in the pivotal role of 'genuine' dialogue and discussion to address the concerns of lower riparian countries over the GERDP. It immediately and unconditionally accepted implementation of all the recommendations of the International Panel of Experts' report, including the suggested studies for a hydropower model and on trans-boundary environment and socio-economic impact issues. At the same time, it is pushing ahead with the construction of the dam in a spirit of mutual development and mutual help based upon trust. The essence of Ethiopia's position is firmly established in a way that any disagreement over sharing of usage of the Nile River should be worked out and resolved by Africans themselves rather than by others from lands far beyond the Nile Basin. Ethiopia indeed is implementing the concept of 'African solutions to African problems.'

What has also proved disappointing to Ethiopia and other upper riparian countries is Egypt's continued conceptualization of the term 'security'. Egyptian politicians and intellectuals seem content to view 'security' as a matter of their own self-interest and 'right', for Egypt, and Egypt alone, to exploit the waters of the Nile solely and eternally. There is no room in this view for any upstream country to share in usage of the river. This characterization of the concept of 'security' hardly conforms to contemporary views of global interdependence. No nation today is sufficient to itself. Interdependence is the norm in the present world affairs. Mr. Jian Zemin, former Chinese President, identified the concept of 'security' with shared visions, interests and benefits of countries in his report to the CCPC. He emphasized that the new and emerging security concept of the 21st century was something cemented by 'mutual benefit, equality and coordination.' Such a new security vista rightly places collective benefits and joint developments higher in a century in which, to quote the late Dr. Kinfe Abraham "'mutual trust is the basis; mutual benefit is the objective; equality is the guarantee; and coordination is the means". Unhappily Egypt appears determined to reject this new approach, consistently returning to the old colonial agreements which claim to uphold the exclusive vision, interest and benefit of the Nile Waters for Egypt.

This underlines the fault line between the Pax Britannica and Pax Africana, a fault line with seriously detrimental social, environmental, economic and security repercussions for all the peoples of the Nile Basin. Egypt's strategy, indeed, can only encourage further inequality, exclusion, state fragility, socio-economic malaise, depletion of water resources and other problems for the region and the whole of the Nile Basin. Water security as defined by Egypt remains in opposition to Ethiopia's right to development, negating fundamental human rights and the sanctity and dignity of the lives of Ethiopians and of millions of East Africans residing along the banks of the Nile River. It infringes upon Ethiopia's sovereign rights to develop, utilize and use its resources within its own territories, resources that include the Blue Nile, Tekezze and Baro-Akobo rivers - as long as these do not have any adverse impact on lower riparian countries. Ethiopia's current aim is to terminate the current unjust, unequal and colonial status of water development along the Nile within the framework of mutual benefit and mutual trust and of fair share and usage.

It is a desire shared by all the other riparian states without exception. Even British imperialists eventually began to question the full ownership of the Nile that they had given to Egypt, raising questions in the 1950s about the future of British East Africa's future water supply and equal entitlement of Nile usage. One of the questions was: what would be the future of the British East Africa with the increasing water demand and equal entitlement of the Nile for their development? Egypt's historical rights have been thoroughly questioned with sound reason by Poet Laureate Tsegaye Gebre-Medhin, who poetically identified the Nile River as "the blood of Ethiopia, the mother of the Cush, the introducer of civilization to the world [born] from the rays of the ancient creature born of the womb of Cush." Ethiopia, the cradle of humanity, developed its first civilizations along the waters of the Nile and its tributaries. Other examples multiplied: the Nubians of Meroe in the Sudan, the Aksumites in Ethiopia, the Pharaonic empires of Egypt, the Makondes of Tanzania and many others erected their temples of African civilization along the river, recognizing the River's sustenance and fertility and its provision of mutual interdependence, human dignity and love for future peoples. What Egypt, above all, as one of the oldest civilizations in Africa and the World, should remember from its historic experience is the importance of genuine shared vision, of the interests and benefits of present and future generations. It should draw the lesson that its own water security must encompass the security and interests of upper riparian countries, not dwell on short-term political or supposed diplomatic gains. Now is the most critical time for the countries of the Nile Basin. According to recent security studies, African states are threatened by continuing high levels of poverty, increasing youth population, unemployment, over-rapid urbanization, inequality, exclusion, conflicts, climate disruption, environmental degradation and other dangers. There is almost universal agreement that greater integration and enhanced partnership are the imperative necessities to enable Africa to resolve these challenges in the years ahead.

The Nile Basin is no exception to this reality. It is home to 20 per cent of the people of Africa. There is no alternative. Egypt, like Sudan and all the other upstream countries, must realize genuine cooperation and continuous discussion, based on the priorities of African Renaissance, including development of comparative advantage, development of infrastructure, bridging the technological divide, human development and consolidation of the peace, security and stability of Africa, is the way to resolve disagreement. The result will provide for greater economic, social, political and cultural integration with a myriad of benefits as well as create a win-win atmosphere in the Nile Basin. Forging partnerships, encouraging mutual benefit, equality, coordination, and a shared vision is the way to heal and replace outdated water imperialism, replace the Pax Britannica with a Pax Africana, and finally erase the unnecessary though deep-rooted fear, suspicion and mistrust still existing in Egypt.

Ed.'s Note: The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of The Reporter.

The Hypocrisy of the West

By Messay Kebede

The West is deploring the referendum in Crimea and threatening to apply economic sanctions against Russia, believed to be the instigator of the unfolding Ukrainian crisis. Some Western politicians even go the extent of advocating direct military aid so that Ukraine can oppose military resistance to the Russian aggression. The referendum, which is supposed to lead to the reintegration of Crimea into the Russian Federation, is characterized by the West as illegal. From what I was able to gather, the reasons why the referendum is considered illegal include the followings. (1) Ukraine is an independent and sovereign country; (2) the referendum takes place with a strong presence of Russian military force in Crimea; (3) the referendum does not offer Crimea the choice of remaining within Ukraine.

What beats everything is that the West did not raise any concern about legality when Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, even though all the reasons enumerated to contest the referendum in Crimea were also present in Ethiopia. Thus, ( 1) Ethiopia is an independent and sovereign nation; (2) the referendum was conducted in the presence of the victorious EPLF army; (3) The choice to remain part of Ethiopia under a new political arrangement was not offered to Eritreans, nor was Ethiopia given the opportunity defend its legitimate position and interests, except through the TPLF government. The latter had no legality other than the power of arms and was already dead set to expel Eritrea from Ethiopia as a dangerous rival to the TPLF hegemony in Ethiopia. Yet, though conducted under such faulty conditions and in direct violation of the sovereignty of Ethiopia, the referendum was declared “fair and free” by the UN Observer Mission.

One thing is sure: we Ethiopians should remember the Western condemnation of the Russian initiative. If, as says the West, the conduct of a referendum in a situation preventing free expression and in an independent and sovereign country is illegal, then undoubtedly the rejection of the referendum in Crimea equally questions the legality of the Eritrean secession. The flaws that make the secession of Crimea illegal are also those that disqualify the Eritrean referendum. This is not to say that Ethiopia should start a war to recover Eritrea, but that it is not compelled to accept its independence so long as it believes, now in accordance with the West, that the referendum was illegal.

Surprising as it may seem, the West is saying that the feeling of the concerned people does not matter as much as the legality of the process. Even if Crimeans in their majority want to be part of Russia, they cannot do it in violation of the national sovereignty of Ukraine. Of course, what explains the application of different criteria is that Russia is a rival superpower while Ethiopia is a poor and weak country. Everything must be done to stop the expansion of Russia. By contrast, nobody should lose sleep over the fragmentation, in direct violation of its national sovereignty, of a country as weak as Ethiopia.